Let’s Stop Blaming the Compact

Members of the Colorado River Commission, in Santa Fe in 1922, after signing the Colorado River Compact. From left, W. S. Norviel (Arizona), Delph E. Carpenter (Colorado), Herbert Hoover (Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of Commission), R. E. Caldwell (Utah), Clarence C. Stetson (Executive Secretary of Commission), Stephen B. Davis, Jr. (New Mexico), Frank C. Emerson (Wyoming), W. F. McClure (California), and James G. Scrugham (Nevada). Photo courtesy of Colorado State University Water Resources Archive.

While floating through the Grand Canyon recently, river guide extraordinaire Bruce Keller taught me a new word: “mumpsimus.”

It means “a traditional notion that is obstinately held although it is unreasonable.”

I immediately thought of the way that the Colorado River Compact is being repeatedly blamed for the current water crisis in the Colorado River system. The oft-stated accusation is that the water shortages we’re experiencing now can be blamed on the fact that the framers of the Compact allocated too much water — much more than the river system could actually deliver. “The river was over-allocated from the beginning.”

In full disclosure, I must admit that I have made similar statements myself in the past. I am guilty of mumsimus. But I have reconsidered my position.

I’ve concluded that blaming the Compact is misleading and unhelpful. Implicating a Compact fashioned 100 years ago obfuscates rightful accountability. The situation we’re in now is not the fault of the Compact’s architects. This one’s on us, on our generation, not theirs.

Here’s my rationale.

We’ve Never Used as Much as Was Allocated

The framers of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 allocated 15 million acre-feet (MAF) per year for use within the US: 7.5 MAF each for the Upper and Lower Basins.** They anticipated that more water would eventually need to be allocated to Mexico. A 1944 treaty with Mexico set that country’s allocation at 1.5 MAF/year.

In sum, a total of 16.5 MAF/year has been allocated for human use.

Annual human uses of the river’s water have never come close to 16.5 MAF. According to estimates by the US Bureau of Reclamation, the average annual consumption for human uses since 2000 is about 12.6 MAF — far below what the Compact allows. The annual use would have likely been higher than 12.6 MAF if not for the Compact. In the early 2000s, California was beginning to use more than its 4.4 MAF portion of the 7.5 MAF/year allocated among the Lower Basin states of California, Arizona, and Nevada, but the federal government reeled it back in so that the total Lower Basin use would not exceed 7.5 MAF.

Yes, There Were Big Oversights 

If the Compact is to be faulted, it should be for the things it didn’t say or anticipate. The framers of the Compact didn’t account for three critically important uses and needs for the river’s water today: (1) water rights legally held but not yet used by Native American tribes; (2) water needed to sustain natural ecosystem health; and (3) evaporation from the many reservoirs that would eventually be built.

Evaporative losses from the reservoirs, plus what is evaporated and transpired from the river and its associated riparian and wetland ecosystems, accounts for another 2.4 MAF/year, bringing the total volume of water consumed for human and natural purposes to about 15 MAF/year.

Still well below what was explicitly allocated in the Compact and the international treaty with Mexico.

I’ll return to the issue of Native American rights and ecosystem needs in a moment.

The Compact Held Up for Nearly 80 Years

Perhaps the greatest tribute to the durability of the Compact is the fact that cities and farmers were able to prosper for nearly 80 years after the Compact was put into place. Cities dependent on the river grew exponentially, and basin farmers were able to grow food for our country and other nations.

The reservoirs in the Colorado River Basin were nearly full in 2000. Virtually nobody was concerned about water shortages. In fact, the conversation at that time was centered on how to share surplus water!

And Then the Climate Changed

During the 20th century, an average of 16.4 MAF/year of water flowed into and through the Colorado River each year, enough to fully serve all human uses and losses of water to evaporation.

Since 2000, that flow of water has decreased to 13.5 MAF/year, the combined result of a warming climate and lessened precipitation — now recognized as the driest 23 years in the past 1200 years. That has left a shortfall of 1.5 MAF/year, and we’ve been pillaging the water stored in big reservoirs such as Lake Mead and Lake Powell to make up the deficit.

The true reason we are experiencing a water shortage crisis in the Colorado River Basin is not because of flaws in the Compact. It is because we have been unable to reduce our use of water commensurate with the reality that the river no longer produces what it did in the last century. If we can’t own up to this truth we will not be able to build a water-secure future.

Making Things Right

It is high time to reckon with the river’s limits, and with the inherent rights of the indigenous inhabitants of the river basin. This is the time — at the 100th anniversary of the Colorado River Compact — to make things right.

The allocations of water made in the Compact and subsequent agreements are now clearly unattainable and should be revised. Given that reality, let’s take the opportunity to also address some shortcomings in the way the Compact was structured. Any reallocation of the river’s water should begin with an inalienable reserve of water for Native Americans — including both what they are already able to use, plus the other water to which they are legally entitled but not using presently. What is not presently being used by the tribes should be left in the river for use by its oldest inhabitants: ancient native creatures like the Colorado pikeminnow and the humpback chub that have been swimming in the river system for millions of years but now teeter at the brink of extinction.

Once the indigenous reserve is legitimately accounted for, the remainder of the 13.5 MAF/year flowing downriver should be shared equitably — in portions that will likely need to be renegotiated among the states and Mexico.

Only by adjusting human needs to what the river is able to give, and only by aligning those needs in a just, equitable, and sustainable manner with native peoples and ecosystems, will we be able to again realize the prosperity envisioned by the Compact’s architects.

Dories at rest on a glorious Grand Canyon eve. Photo by Brian Richter

** The Compact also allowed the lower basin states to use their own tributaries to the Colorado, but that additional 1 MAF doesn’t get included in the river’s annual budget tracking so I’ll ignore it here as well simply to match numbers with the Bureau of Reclamation. However, true and full water budget accounting for the river basin should include the water supply from the tributaries in the Lower Basin as well as the uses of that water.

As always, if I got something wrong or you want to share another perspective, please comment below.

4 Responses

  1. The US Supreme Court decided Winters v US in 1908 establishing Winters doctrine recognizing Indian reserved water rights. So, from my perspectives, Indian claims was always in the background.

    Anyone paid attention to Az v Ca recognizing Indian water rights?

    In the 1990s, Grand Canyon Trust funded my study of the Colorado River addressing implications of natural flows falling to levels identified by tree ring studies.

    As part of that study, I noted that CA seven party agreement allocating 4.4 mil af among nonIndians is junior to Indian water rights.

    MWD legal counsel wrote a letter claiming that Indian water rights were a claim only on ag users.

    Finally, QSA recognized seniority of Indian water rights and misc PPRs, with junior MWD responsible for cutting back use of Colorado River water for all use above 14,500 af per year.

    Takeaways. Due diligence is always a great idea. Avoid group think. Look at data and think about risk management. These are the failures exposed today

  2. Glenn Younger

    Well said.
    One of the issues that was masterfully avoided, and I’ve Give Delph Carpenter credit for this, is the issue of trans-basin diversions. Delph was likely the most educated person on this topic. He had defended the State of Colorado in the SCOTUS case Wyo v. Colorado. Colorado lost and Delph was very clear on two thing. Intra-State downstream rights would be recognized by SCOTUS, and the diversions that Colorado had already made would be considered if another case went to SCOTUS.
    Delph understood more than anyone that a compact was Colorado’s only salvation after the Kansas and Wy v Colorado rulings. Delph was politically savvy enough to not bring up issues that would harm his (and my) home state during compact discussions.
    The water that flowed past Lee’s Ferry gauge never included the water that had previously been diverted. And the Compact give Colorado a pass instead focusing on the 7.5 MAF to be delivered to the lower basin.
    The few MAF that is lost to upper basin trans-basin diversions, groundwater re-charge, the evaporative losses in Lakes Powell and Mead, and the lower basin diversions to Las Vegas, and MWD, are all areas that were not on the table before, and should be now.
    Early trans-basin diversions, Groundwater re-charge, Evaporative losses,
    Add in the Native & environmental water rights, and then priorities for use (food vs. urban uses) and there is a full table.
    The big question is: do we have the people who can negotiate a compromise? That may turn out to be the biggest shortage of all.

  3. George Rhee

    I think there are several valid reasons for blaming the compact.
    1. They ignored uncertainties in the mean flows. With the data available at the time one could say with confidence that the mean flow lay somewhere in the range of 12-22 MAF/year. That is a huge uncertainty. They should have planned for scenarios consistent with this uncertainty. This tradition of ignoring uncertainties when evaluating risk unfortunately continues to the present day.
    2. USGS scientist Eugene Larue had told them that the mean flows were more likely to be closer to 15MAF/year based on using data from the Great Salt Lake as a proxy for river flows.
    3. Giving the illusion of certainty with water rights that are illusory has given a false confidence to people who believe that legal documents are more important than scientific analysis in matters where the laws of science are the limiting factor.
    4. The inability to adjust the compact numbers given that its numbers have been repeatedly proven to be false for a century suggests that compacts with frozen numbers are not the way to go. You need to adjust to what the data are telling you.

    I think it may be helpful to acknowledge past mistakes in moving forward to avoid repeating them.

  4. Mark Murphy

    Another interesting aspect of the compact that I like to cite is Hoover’s speech to Congress, post signing. He admitted that there may be unknown unknowns in the Compact accounting that will be revealed in the future; however, he had faith that also in the future there will be reasonable people who can meet, negotiate and compromise to correct these errors.

    I await the future.

Leave a Reply